Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
gavrielc
5fb10645cd fix: mount project root read-only to prevent container escape (#392)
The main group's project root was mounted read-write, allowing the
container agent to modify host application code (e.g. dist/container-runner.js)
to inject arbitrary mounts on next restart — a full sandbox escape.

Fix: mount the project root read-only. Writable paths the agent needs
(group folder, IPC, .claude/) are already mounted separately. The
agent-runner source is now copied into a per-group writable location
so agents can still customize container-side behavior without affecting
host code or other groups.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-22 20:57:57 +02:00
gavrielc
c6e1bfecc6 refactor: extract runtime-specific code into src/container-runtime.ts (#321)
Move all container-runtime-specific logic (binary name, mount args,
stop command, startup check, orphan cleanup) into a single file so
swapping runtimes only requires replacing this one file.

Neutralize "Apple Container" references in comments and docs that
would become incorrect after a runtime swap. References that list
both runtimes as options are left unchanged.

No behavior change — Apple Container remains the default runtime.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-20 13:13:55 +02:00
gavrielc
05a29d562f Security improvements: per-group session isolation, remove built-in Gmail
- Isolate Claude sessions per-group (data/sessions/{group}/.claude/)
  to prevent cross-group access to conversation history
- Remove Gmail MCP from built-in (now available via /add-gmail skill)
- Add SECURITY.md documenting the security model
- Move docs to docs/ folder (SPEC.md, REQUIREMENTS.md, SECURITY.md)
- Update documentation to reflect changes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-02 00:07:59 +02:00